Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020008-3

~~TOP SECRET~~ T.W. Becker's copy

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SITUATION IN KOREA

I - GENERAL ANALYSIS

A. **Various Possible Politico-Military Objectives**

1. Unify Korea by force.
2. Maximum destruction of Communist forces within Korea.
3. Withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from Korea as a result of military pressure directly on China.
4. Stabilize military situation.
5. Withdraw from Korea.

25X1

B. **General Military Choices of Action Open to the UNC in Korea**

1. Unlimited operations and advance northward: Advantages and Disadvantages.
2. Stabilization on or about Kansas line and construction of strong fixed defenses: Advantages and Disadvantages.
3. Withdrawal of UN forces into a more restricted area: Advantages and Disadvantages.
4. Decisive Measures to end fighting or compel a settlement.

C. **Present and Prospective Relative Capabilities**

1. **Air Superiority:** CIA and perhaps Div. of Intel A-2 will prepare a study on Soviet air production estimates. Defense and CIA will prepare an estimate of US and allied production.

CIA

2. **Ground Forces:** JIC and JSPC perhaps should prepare this study. Should include expansion and replacement capabilities on both sides (UN especially), adaptability to tactical requirements of Korean combat, and logistic questions.
3. **ROK forces** as a special problem.

Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020008-3

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020008-3

BEST COPY
Available

Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020008-3

Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020008-3

C Political, Psychological, Economic Warfare Courses of Action in Korea – PSB.

D. **Vulnerabilities of Communist China**

SL-5
NIE-32

1. Military.
2. Economic.
3. Political.

E. **Vulnerabilities of UK and US**

1. Exposure of Japan.
2. Danger to logistic support of Korea.
3. Political and diplomatic unity in the Free World.

F. **Problems of American Public Opinion**

Project for PSB

G. **Questions of Timing and Initiative**

1. Indefinite talks – how to prevent.
2. Breakdown of talks – how to define.
3. Desirability of maintaining initiative.
4. Morale factors.
5. General Assembly.
6. Winter warfare.
7. Military situation in other areas of the Far East.

H. **Other Considerations**

1. Relation of Korea to Japan.
2. Possible Sino-Soviet moves. X
Sino-Soviet relations + their implications on Korea + reaction to US courses of action — [redacted] as a target.
3. Social and economic situation within [redacted].

ILLEGIB

I. **Conclusions**

1. Freedom of action.
2. Military power.
3. Maximum position.

Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020008-3

Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020008-3

II - ANALYSIS OF PARTICULAR COURSES OF ACTION FOR 3 SITUATIONS - INDEFINITE TALKS, BREAKDOWN OF ARMISTICE, AND SUCCESSFUL ARMISTICE

A. Mobilization

Applies in one or two.

B. Military Actions

1. Immediate effects

a. Increased ground operations - scale objectives.

b. Air actions - targets, mission.

c. Blockade of China.

d. Others.

2. Long-range

a. Covert operations.

b. Japanese defense forces.

c. ROK forces.

d. Chinese Nationalists.

C. UN Actions

1. Economic measures and political pressure.

2. General Assembly Resolutions.

3. More forces.

D. Diplomatic

Direct intervention with the Kremlin on armistice - Truman to Stalin note.

E. Successful Armistice

Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020008-3